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Abstract: I defend a relational account of difference in the moral status between fetuses and 
newborns. The difference in moral status between a fetus and a newborn is that the newborn 
baby is the proper object of ‘parental responsibility’ whereas the fetus is not. ‘Parental 
responsibilities’ are a moral dimension of a ‘parent-child relation’, a relation which newborn 
babies stand in, but fetuses do not. I defend this relational account by analyzing the concepts of 
‘parent’ and ‘child’, and conclude that the difference in the moral status between fetuses and 
newborns means one may claim abortion is morally permissible while also claiming infanticide 
is not morally permissible, without inconsistency between the two claims. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to delineate and defend a relational account of the difference in 
the moral status between fetuses and newborns, and its implications for claims of the moral 
permissibility or impermissibility of abortion and ‘after-birth abortion’1 (or infanticide). The 
uniqueness of the offered account is that it explains the difference in moral status between 
fetuses and newborns without appeal to intrinsic features, such as personhood or the rights to life 
of an individual. Instead, the relevant moral status, that is, the moral status which matters for 
ethical questions of abortion and infanticide, is marked by special relational features, rather than 
more commonly exploited intrinsic features. Specifically, it is what I will call the ‘parent-child 
relation’, and what this relation carries with it. This relation has a moral dimension in that it 
carries with it special moral responsibilities for those who stand in it, particularly for those on the 
‘parent’ side. I will call these special moral responsibilities ‘parental responsibilities’. They are 
the responsibilities that bind one in so far as one is a parent to a child. I argue that the difference 
in moral status between a fetus and a newborn is that the newborn has the relational morally 
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relevant feature of being the proper object of parental responsibilities, while the fetus does not. 
This is because the fetus conceptually understood is not the sort of thing that can stand in a 
parent-child relation. Being the proper object of parental responsibilities is a morally relevant 
feature that enhances the moral worth of a newborn over and above that of a fetus, as this is one 
moral consideration which applies to newborns but not to fetuses. Therefore, there is a difference 
in moral status between fetuses and newborns. As a consequence for the question of the moral 
permissibility of abortion and infanticide, there is no inconsistency in claiming abortion is 
morally permissible while also claiming infanticide is morally impermissible. 
THE DIFFERENCE IN MORAL STATUS BETWEEN FETUSES AND NEWBORNS 
The premise that fetuses and newborns have equal moral status is a common one in the 
dialectic of the ethics of abortion. It has a long history in debates on the ethics of abortion, 
especially with Catholic and pro-life positions
2
. But, not all arguments that use this premise are 
religious arguments. For example, Nikolaus Johannes Knoepffler and Martin J O’Malley argue 
from a secular perspective that the right to life as recognized by the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights ought to be granted both to human newborns and unborn human 
fetuses
3
. Because both are in some sense human, and humans have a fundamental dignity, thus 
both have a right to life that ought to be respected. However, utilization of this common premise 
that fetuses and newborns have equal moral status is not only used to argue against the moral 
permissibility of abortion.  
C.A.J. Coady
4
 points out that this common premise is utilized not only in anti-abortion 
arguments, but also in ‘after-birth abortion’ arguments. One such after-birth abortion argument is 
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presented by Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva
5
. They argue that after-birth abortion, or 
infanticide
6
, should be permissible in all cases that abortion is permissible
7
.To clarify, Giubilini 
and Minerva do not argue that killing babies is morally permissible. Instead, they point out if 
abortion is morally permissible, then consistency demands that infanticide is also morally 
permissible, as similar reasons apply in both cases. One of the presuppositions of their argument 
is the common premise that fetuses and infants have equal moral status. They state, “The moral 
status of an infant is equivalent to that of a fetus in the sense that both lack those properties that 
justify the attribution of a right to life to an individual.”8 By drawing equivalence in moral status 
between fetuses and newborns, anti-abortionists appeal to the fetuses’ potential to become 
persons as grounds for the moral rights of the fetus, just as with newborns. On the other hand, 
those who argue for the after-birth abortion position use the equivalence in moral status between 
fetuses and newborns as grounds for a different conclusion. They argue due to the equivalence in 
moral status between fetuses and newborns, some grounds to think abortion is morally 
permissible are also grounds to think infanticide is morally permissible. 
Giubilini’s and Minerva’s utilize the common premise to deny the attribution of a right to 
life of the individual (an intrinsic morally relevant feature) from both fetuses and newborns. 
Neither the fetus nor the newborn is a ‘person’ in a morally relevant sense9. Consistency would 
appear to require both abortion and infanticide to be morally permissible. Because personhood 
has traditionally been the marker for moral status, and plays a role in Giubilini’s and Minerva’s 
argument, some argue against the pair on grounds that they presuppose an incorrect or 
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controversial account of personhood
10
. Others argue personhood is only one possible determinate 
of moral status
11
, and that it is possible for something to have moral status without being a 
person. So, there is focus on personhood by proponents of competing views.  
In a similar appeal to consistency, David B. Hershenov and Rose J. Hershenov
12
 contend 
that fetuses and newborns share the same intrinsic morally relevant features. They state, “there is 
no way to distinguish an infant from a fetus in terms of an intrinsic morally relevant feature that 
the former has and the latter lacks—neither one is rational, morally responsible, self-conscious, 
concerned about the future, etc.”13 Because fetuses and newborns are the same in their intrinsic 
morally relevant features, abortion and infanticide must either be both morally impermissible or 
both morally permissible. This is a particular problem for those sympathetic to a ‘pro-choice’ 
view of abortion. A point of agreement between ‘pro-choice’ and ‘pro-life’ folk is that neither 
group believes infanticide is morally permissible, but ‘pro-choice’ folk do believe abortion is 
morally permissible. Thus, the ‘pro-choice’ folk appear to be inconsistent.   
A serious challenge then is to explain how it could be the case that abortion, understood 
as the termination of a fetus, is morally permissible, while infanticide, understood as killing 
one’s newborn, is not morally permissible. Thus far, ethicists have primarily focused on intrinsic 
morally relevant features of fetuses and newborns. The right to life, human dignity, personhood, 
rational capacity, and having a certain sort of consciousness are all (amongst others) common 
intrinsic features taken as relevant to establishing moral status. By focusing on intrinsic morally 
relevant features, those on all sides of the debate come to accept the common premise that 
fetuses and newborns have equal moral status. But, intrinsic features are not exhaustive of what 
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is relevant for establishing moral status. There are non-intrinsic features, specifically relational 
features, which must be considered when trying to understand the moral statuses’ of fetuses and 
newborns.      
By examining a specific relational morally relevant feature of newborns, I will show 
there is a difference in the moral status between fetuses and newborns such that there is no 
inconsistency in claiming abortion is morally permissible while also claiming infanticide is 
morally impermissible. I will argue for this relational account by examining the relation between 
the concepts of ‘parent’ and ‘child’, and the moral dimensions of this conceptual relation. 
My account builds on Neil levy’s relational account14 of the moral worth of newborns. 
On a relational account, newborn babies have moral worth that depends on relational rather than 
intrinsic facts about them
15
. Amongst other things, newborns have moral worth due to relational 
status with their parents. While Levy offers an account of how newborns have moral worth, I go 
further. I offer an advancement of a relational account a morally relevant feature of newborns, 
arguing that the special relational properties of newborn are not only a source of moral worth, 
but that the relational morally relevant feature that newborns have is one fetuses do not. Ergo, 
the fetus and the newborn do not have equal moral status. This is because of the specific relation 
newborns stand in, called the parent-child relation. This parent-child relation grants parents 
special moral responsibilities, called parental responsibilities, for which the newborn is the 
proper object, but the fetus is not. As such, being the proper object of parental responsibility is 
one moral consideration that applies to newborns but not to fetuses. 
Parental responsibilities are a subset of more general moral responsibilities. What 
distinguishes parental responsibilities from more general moral responsibilities is that parental 
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ones are those special responsibilities people have in virtue of having the status of ‘parent’. In 
describing the becoming of a parent, Andrew McGee states, “The special moment of childbirth 
and the joy of holding your son or daughter for the very first time are monumental events in 
human life. It is at this point that so much of our responsibility towards them—our very life with 
them—truly begins.”16 McGee points out not just the significance of becoming a parent in terms 
of the impact on one’s life, but also notes the nature of the special relation parents have to their 
children, namely one of responsibility. The concept of parent can be understood then as one with 
which special moral responsibilities, or parental responsibilities, are entangled. Those who have 
children, raise children, are the legal guardians of children, or are primary care-givers of children 
are intuitive examples of people who act in the role parents, and therefore have parental 
responsibilities in virtue of their role. So, parental responsibilities are to be understood as those 
special moral responsibilities that belong to those who are parents. 
If in any case where one is a parent, one also has parental responsibilities in virtue of 
being a parent, one may wonder how these parental responsibilities are acquired. In other words, 
what is the source of parental responsibilities? Joseph Millum proposes a ‘conventional-acts’17 
account of the acquisition of parental responsibilities. On this account, parental responsibilities 
“are taken on by individuals through acts whose meaning is determined by social convention.”18 
Two paradigmatic examples of taking on the role of parent and thus the accompanying parental 
responsibilities are giving birth and adopting children. Social convention dictates that the 
biological mother of a newborn is in normal circumstances also that newborn’s parent in the 
broader sense with all the responsibility that comes with that role. Social convention also dictates 
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that those who commit to adoption become adoptive parents and thus acquire parental 
responsibilities by committing to and taking on the role of parent. 
But this conventions-act account of the acquisition of parental responsibilities faces a 
Euthyphronic dilemma. If we are to take moral responsibilities seriously, they must not be 
arbitrary. However what the conventions of a society are is arbitrary. So, if moral responsibilities 
are to be taken seriously, either social convention tracks ‘stance-independent’19 moral truths (that 
is that there are better or worse conventions independently of what a society’s actual conventions 
are) or the conventions dictating parental responsibilities are arbitrary. It is a problem for the 
moral binding-ness of parental responsibilities if they are rooted in arbitrary conventions. 
Because of this dilemma and to avoid an account of the acquisition of moral responsibilities 
which reduces to a form of moral relativism, I suggest that parental responsibilities are not 
acquired by social conventions but instead that the acquisition of parental responsibilities 
intrinsically tied to the role of parent. The role of parent is entangled with moral responsibilities. 
It is this entanglement with moral responsibilities that distinguishes a parent from a mere 
biological progenitor. 
Because the role of parent is entangled with moral responsibilities, the real question is 
how does one acquire the role of parent and enter a parent-child relation? Two obvious answers 
are by choosing to have biological children or adopting children. When a person accepts a 
pregnancy, or decides to adopt, they are moving toward the role of parent. Once the baby is born, 
or the adoption is finalized, the person becomes a parent. One may point out that this notion of 
becoming a parent implies that the putting up of a child for adoption is a violation of parental 
responsibilities. However, my claim is only about how one becomes a parent and thus acquires 
parental responsibilities and not about what the particular responsibilities parents have.  
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Furthermore, while parenthood is entangled with moral responsibilities, it does not mean 
that one cannot become free of those responsibilities. It is possible to be relinquished of the role 
of parent and the accompanying moral responsibilities much like how it is possible to be relieved 
of a promise if the person one makes a promise to relieve them of their responsibility as the 
promise-maker. Putting a child up for adoption is one such way a person relinquishes the parent-
child relation and the entangled moral responsibilities. One may wonder then under what 
conditions it is morally permissible to place one’s child up for adoption if one’s role as a parent 
is entangled with moral responsibilities to that child. I do not rule out the possibility of cases in 
which placing one’s child up for adoption is not only consistent with parental responsibilities but 
demanded by them. I am imagining a case in where the parent cannot live up to their moral 
responsibilities and treat their child as the proper object of them by their own devices. When 
parents find themselves in extreme circumstances, parental responsibilities may require that the 
parent who is not fit to parent ought to give up their role of parent to another entity. This is to say 
that there are cases, usually ones of extreme circumstances, in which a parent can relieve 
themselves of their parental responsibilities and thus their status as parent in that particular 
parent child-relation despite those responsibilities being entangled with that status of parent. 
Because the status of parent is relational status, to be a parent is not due to any intrinsic 
features or qualities of a person. Rather, to be a parent depends on having children of one’s 
own
20
, and is therefore dependent on standing in relation to others. Having the status of parent 
means one stands in a parent-child relation with another, where that other is the child. The same 
is true for status of child.  
Newborns are the proper object of parental care and are the proper object of parental 
responsibilities. This means that parental responsibilities are those one has for the newborn with 
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whom they stand in parent-child relation. It is this special status, the status of being the proper 
object of parental responsibility, which belongs to the newborn baby. Because parental 
responsibilities are moral responsibilities, it is wrong to violate them if one has them. Killing 
one’s newborn (the newborn with which one stands in a parent-child relation) constitutes a 
violation of one’s parental responsibilities, and is therefore wrong.  
While one way to try and argue for the conclusion that killing a newborn is wrong is to 
claim the newborn has some intrinsic morally relevant feature, such as a right to life, 
personhood, or a certain capacity for consciousness and feeling, I have shown there is another 
way. The special relational features between parents and their children carry with them special 
moral responsibilities that one would be violating if they killed their newborn. However, a 
difference between this relational account and more common appeals to intrinsic morally 
relevant features is that this relational account cannot be appropriately adjusted to apply to 
fetuses. The unborn fetus is not the proper object of parental responsibility. This is because the 
fetus is not the sort of thing that can stand in a parent-child relation.  
To see why it is the case that a fetus is not the sort of thing which can stand in a parent-
child relation, we must examine the concepts of parent and child more closely. What we will find 
is that thinking that a fetus is the sort of thing which can stand in a parent-child relation requires 
a most confused conception of the concepts of parent and child. Consider the commonplace 
attribution of the status of parent, a mother with her newborn. The mother in this case is a 
paradigmatic example of a parent. But now consider a couple consisting of a man and a pregnant 
woman who have no prior children. In this scenario, would it be appropriate to attribute to either 
of them the status of parent? I think not. The pregnant woman in this case is not a mother, nor is 
the man a father. While it may be likely they will become parents, at present they are not. Both 
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are only potential parents. Because the couple in this case are not parents, they do not stand in a 
parent-child relation. This has direct implications on the metaphysical and moral status of the 
fetus in this scenario. We can say that the fetus then also does not stand in a parent-child relation. 
Both sides of the parent-child relation are absent, for there are not parents and the fetus is not a 
child, and therefore nothing for the fetus to stand in the relevant relational status with. Thinking 
that the fetus does stand-in a parent-child relation requires a problematic conception of what it 
means to be a parent. If it is the case the potential parent is to be understood as having the status 
of parent, the concept of a parent would become an absurd category. We would have to accept 
that anything that could be a potential parent is also a parent. Such treatment devolves the 
concept of parent to the point of meaninglessness, for the concept becomes so broad as to lose all 
distinguishing features. So, potential parents are not parents. Because thinking a fetus stands in a 
parent-child relation requires a confused conception of the concept of parent, the fetus does not 
stand in a parent-child relation, and thus cannot be the object of parental responsibility.  
One may object to this on grounds that the fetus is in fact a child. As such, the fetus must 
stand in a parent-child relation, and therefore be a proper object of parental responsibilities. One 
might think that when a woman is pregnant there already exists a child because there is an 
organism which shares DNA with its parents
21
. While it is common to refer to a fetus as an 
‘unborn child’, this is inaccurate. We can distinguish between two senses of the term ‘child’. The 
fetus is certainly is a child in some biological sense but is not a child in a morally relevant sense. 
To think of a fetus as a child understood as the proper object of parental responsibilities is akin to 
think of a planted seed as a grown sprout. A planted seed is positioned to grow into a sprout but 
has yet to become one. Similarly, a fetus is positioned to become a child but is not yet one. To be 
growing towards something requires that one is not yet there. A fetus is only a potential child in 
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the same way a planted seed is a potential sprout, and it would be a mistake to confuse such 
potentiality with actuality. Potential things do not have the same rights and moral status of actual 
those things
22
. Potential judges are not judges, potential home owners are not home owners, 
potential people are not people, and potential children are not children. Because a fetus is still on 
its way to becoming a child in the morally relevant sense, it is not, nor could it be, a child in the 
morally relevant sense. Thus, a fetus cannot stand in a parent-child relation. 
Still, one may contend that all that is required to understand the fetus as a child in the 
morally relevant sense is too recognize the fetus as the biological germinating organism of the 
woman carrying it. To be the pregnant woman’s child in the morally relevant sense requires only 
that the fetus is an organism with the appropriate biological connection to the pregnant woman. 
One may try to argue from this biological account of childhood to show that the fetus is a child 
in the morally relevant sense, can stand in a parent-child relation, and be the proper object of 
parental responsibilities. However, this biological account is untenable. Merely knowing the 
biological connections and features the fetus has tell us nothing about what moral features it may 
have. It is not clear what moral significance standing in a biological connection with a pregnant 
woman has. To take a fetus’s biological connection to the woman carrying them somehow 
meaning that the fetus also stands in the relevant moral relation with the same woman only 
assumes the truth of precisely what is in dispute. A fetus by its nature stands in a biological 
relation with a pregnant woman. The question is whether it also stands in the relevant moral 
relation. Pointing out a fetus’ biological features tells us nothing about its moral features, if there 
even are any such moral features.  
Lacking argumentative support is not the only issue with this biological account. It is also 
too narrow an account in that it restricts the status of being a child in the morally relevant sense 
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to those organisms which share DNA with the people that carried them. This is a mistake, for 
biological connections are not the only way for beings to stand in a parent-child relation. Those 
who adopt children are examples of people who stand in a parent-child relation with their 
adopted children but do not necessarily share DNA or have any biological connection with those 
children. What creates a parent-child relation with adoptive parents and their adopted children 
has nothing to do with any sort of biological connection. Being an organism that shares the DNA 
of another is not necessary for standing in a parent-child relation. Nor is it the case that being an 
organism that shares the DNA of another is sufficient for standing in a parent-child relation. 
While a growing fetus shares DNA with the pregnant woman, it is still on its way to developing 
into a child, and therefore is not yet the sort of thing that could stand in such a relation. 
But even if the fetus is not a child, why think there are no parental responsibilities 
towards it? Even though pregnant women and fetuses they carry stand only in a potential parent-
child relation there still seems to be certain responsibilities pregnant women have toward their 
fetuses. For example, it is right that women ought not to consume alcohol while pregnant, as this 
has foreseeable and severely harmful consequences once the baby is born. It would be 
irresponsible to act in a way that would cause future harm to one’s newborn. There may even be 
responsibilities people have before they are pregnant, such as ensuring they are in a sound 
financial position so that they can actually support a newborn. So, it would appear there are some 
responsibilities people have toward the fetuses they carry that appear similar to responsibilities 
parents have to their children in so far as they are prospective parents. While some choose not to 
become parents by preventing pregnancy or having an abortion, those who accept pregnancy 
have responsibilities that resemble the responsibilities parents have toward their children. One 
might think then that parenthood and parental responsibilities begin before birth. 
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However, the metaphysical relation between the pregnant woman and the carried fetus is 
different from a parent-child relation. The responsibilities at work in the case of pregnant women 
not being allowed to consume alcohol has to do with responsibilities of pregnancy and not 
responsibilities of parenthood, for the pregnant women is not yet a parent. Whatever 
responsibilities a pregnant woman has toward their carried fetus (if any) are not parental 
responsibilities because their relation is one of a pregnant woman and fetus, and not of a parent 
and child. Consider the responsibilities a babysitter has to ta baby they are babysitting. Their 
responsibilities, whatever they may be, are not parental ones for the babysitter is not the baby’s 
parent and their relation with the child is not a parent-child relation, even though the particular 
responsibilities the babysitter has may be the same as the parent’s. Whatever special relationship 
pregnant women have with their fetuses is not parenthood for the aforementioned reason that 
potentiality is not the same as actuality. Women who have accepted their pregnancy are only 
potential or prospective parents, not actual ones. We should think of this in terms one owning a 
rose garden. Once I go buy my rose seeds and accept my new life as a rose gardener, I am still 
just a potential or prospective owner of a rose garden. It is not until the roses have grown I can 
say I am the owner of a rose garden, for until the roses have grown there is no rose garden for me 
to own. Similarly, prospective parents, whatever special moral responsibilities they may have, do 
not have parental responsibilities as they are not yet parents.    
 Moreover, the moral responsibilities one has during pregnancy are not responsibilities 
one has toward their carried fetus. This is to say that the fetus is not the proper object of the 
responsibilities of pregnancy and that even when it comes to the responsibilities of pregnancy the 
fetus is not the ultimate object of moral concern. Consider what the makes it the case that 
consuming alcohol during pregnancy wrong. The wrongness of consuming alcohol during 
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pregnancy consists of the harms it would have to the born child. It is the born child that will 
suffer the effects of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome. If it were the case that impairing the fetus by 
consuming alcohol was without harms to the born child, then it would not be clear what exactly 
the wrong of consuming alcohol during pregnancy consists of. In such a counterfactual case, it 
would not be wrong, for there would be nothing of moral significance to make it wrong.   
Some argue because impairment of fetus via alcohol consumption during pregnancy is 
wrong, abortion is also wrong
23
. While consumption of alcohol is certainly damaging to the 
fetus, the morally relevant harm is ultimately suffered by the born child. Consider an alternative 
universe where pregnant women do not give birth but simply carry fetuses forever. If a woman 
were to consume alcohol and damage the fetus in this alternate universe, would they be doing 
something wrong? In this universe, there would be nothing that would go on to suffer from the 
damage done to the fetus, and thus nothing for the woman’s actions to wrong. This thought 
experiment is to demonstrate that it is only the born child that is the object of moral 
consideration. In a world where fetuses do not become born children, it is not clear what their 
morally relevant features are, and therefore not clear why impairing fetuses would be wrong. The 
important distinction at work here is the one between harming or impairing a thing and wronging 
a thing. The harm a pregnant woman would do by consuming alcohol does not constitute 
wrongdoing to the fetus. Instead, it is a wrongdoing toward the future child, for it is the born 
baby that will suffer. Thus, a pregnant woman’s irresponsible action of consuming alcohol would 
be a violation of their responsibilities of pregnancy of which the proper object is the born child, 
not the fetus. This creates a dis-analogy for those want to draw moral similarities between 
abortion and damaging a fetus. When one damages a fetus, one is wronging the future born child 
(assuming the pregnant woman will go on to give birth), but when one has an abortion there is no 
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future born child to be wronged
24
, so there is a dis-analogy between abortion and harmful actions 
that would result in wrongdoing to the future born child. This shows that even the unique moral 
responsibilities that bind pregnant women are not to the fetus. The responsibilities one has for 
caring for the fetus are ultimately to benefit the born child who is the proper object of moral 
concern. While the responsibilities prospective parents have are not parental responsibilities, the 
fact that it is the prospective child and not the fetus that is their proper object of moral concern 
adds further difficult for the question of what the morally relevant feature of fetuses is, for even 
preventing harm to and taking care of the fetus is not done for the fetus’s sake, but instead for the 
sake of the born child.  
This brings us to the following: the newborn, because it stands in a parent-child relation, 
is the proper object of special moral responsibilities, or parental responsibilities, and the fetus, 
because it is not the sort of thing which can stand in a parent-child relation, cannot be the object 
of parental responsibility. Because the parental responsibilities are a specific sort of moral 
responsibilities, it is wrong to violate them. To commit infanticide, understood as killing one’s 
newborn, is a violation of one’s parental responsibilities, and is therefore wrong. This is a moral 
consideration that applies to newborns but not to fetuses. There are no parental responsibilities 
toward a fetus, for a fetus is not the sort of thing which can stand in the sort of relation required 
to be the proper object of those responsibilities. The special relationship pregnant women stand 
in with their carried fetuses is not parenthood, and any special responsibilities one has during 
pregnancy are not parental responsibilities but are nevertheless for the future born child and not 
the fetus, as only the newborn is the ultimate object of moral concern. This additional moral 
consideration of being the proper object of parental responsibilities is a relational morally 
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relevant feature that newborns have but fetuses do not. Because this moral consideration applies 
to newborns but not to fetuses, there is a difference in their respective moral statuses.  
Still, one could accept that fetuses are not the proper objects of parental responsibilities, 
but argue there could still be other special moral responsibilities or considerations that apply to 
fetuses that keeps their moral status level with newborns. That is to say, it could still be the case 
that fetuses have moral worth sufficient to make abortion morally impermissible. Equivalence in 
moral status need not be a result of equivalence in the source of moral status. That is to say that 
fetuses and newborns could still have equal moral status, for the moral worth of a fetus may be 
grounded in some other special moral consideration unique to fetuses. However, there is a 
massive burden of proof for those who wish to maintain equivalence in moral status between 
fetuses and newborns to explain the source of this moral equivalence. Proponents of the equal 
status of fetuses and newborns must explain what the nature of the special moral considerations 
unique to fetuses is, if indeed there are any such considerations. As of now, there is no clear 
moral consideration, no morally relevant feature, unique to fetuses to put them on par in moral 
status with newborns. Considerations such as personhood, potential personhood, and a right to 
life are problematic, for fetuses are not nor ever have been conscious in the way required for 
personhood in a morally relevant sense
25
, nor does their right to life (if indeed there is such a 
right) entail a right to freely occupy a woman’s body26. But, if we were to list all the possible 
moral considerations that might apply to fetuses and newborns, the list would be longer for the 
newborn. This is because between fetuses and newborns only newborns are the proper objects of 
parental responsibilities. 
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One may argue that the relational account I offer fails to count orphan children as morally 
significant. If being the proper object of parental responsibility is what makes killing a newborn 
wrong, then it appears it would not be wrong to kill a newborn that is not an object of parental 
responsibility. A newborn orphan or any orphan child fits this description, for they do not have 
parents and thus do not stand in a parent-child relation. It is highly counter-intuitive that killing 
orphan children is permissible. I agree that it is counter-intuitive, but it is not an implication of 
my account. This is because my account is only an account of one relational morally relevant 
feature of newborns that is not a morally relevant feature of fetuses. I do not claim that the 
relational morally relevant feature of being proper object of parental responsibilities is the only 
morally relevant feature of newborns. The problem of the moral status of orphan babies can be 
accounted for by looking at what has already been discussed in the literature. One can look to 
features such as having a certain kind of consciousness, a certain capacity for feeling, and the 
capacity for first-person experience. These intrinsic morally relevant features apply to newborns 
that are conscious and can feel. So, we can already account for the wrongness of killing orphan 
newborns. Even though orphan newborns do not stand in a parent-child relation and are not the 
proper objects of parental responsibilities, it is not an implication of my account that killing 
orphan children is permissible, because my account leaves open that there are other morally 
relevant features of newborns such as consciousness and feeling, which incidentally are features 
most aborted fetuses do not have
27
. 
CONCLUSION 
Though the common premise that fetuses and newborns have equal moral status is 
utilized in arguments for multiple positions in the abortion debate, I have shown this premise is 
false. By examining the relational morally relevant features of newborns, one finds that the moral 
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consideration of being the proper object of parental responsibilities applies to newborns but not 
to fetuses. Thus, there is a difference in moral status between the two. The upshot of this 
difference in moral status is that it is not inconsistent to claim abortion is morally permissible, 
while also claiming infanticide is not morally permissible. Additionally, it means that any 
arguments can no longer appeal to the common premise that fetuses and newborns have equal 
moral status if they are to be sound. If one is to maintain that there could still be some morally 
relevant feature of fetuses, such as being the object of special moral responsibilities, sufficient 
enough for abortion to be wrong or for fetuses to share equal moral worth with newborns, there 
is a great burden of proof to explain what those supposed morally relevant features are. The 
important difference now is that answers to such questions cannot be soundly argued for by 
appealing to equivalence in moral status between fetuses and newborns. 
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